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SCIENCE: AUGUSTINIAN OR DUHEMIAN? 
Alvin Plantinga 
This paper is a continuation of a discussion with Ernan McMullin; its topic 
is the question how theists (in particular, Christian theists) should think 
about modern science-the whole range of modern science, including eco-
nomics, psychology, sociobiology and so on. Should they follow Augustine 
in thinking that many large scale scientific projects as well as intellectual 
projects generally are in the service of one or the other of the civitates? Or 
should they follow Duhem, who (at least in the case of physics)held that 
proper science is independent of metaphysical, theological or (broadly) reli-
gious concerns? The focus of the discussion is biology; I support the 
Augustinian line of thought, while McMullin is more inclined to the 
Duhemian. I conclude by defending the idea that the epistemic probability 
of the Grand Evolutionary Scenario on Christian theism together with the 
empirical evidence is somewhat less than 1/2. 
One of the most spectacular intellectual developments of the last 400 
years has been the rise of modern science. Science has of course trans-
formed our lives (both for good and ill). It is also, however, an intellec-
tual process and structure boasting magnificent depth, power and beau-
ty-due, in large part, to its cooperative nature, the way in which hun-
dreds of people can work together and take advantage of each others 
results. Modern science took root and flourished in the soil of Christian 
theism, nourished by the Christian belief that both we and the world 
were created by the same personal, conscious, and intelligent God-a 
God, furthermore, who created us in his image, thus enabling us to 
resemble him in the capacity to form true beliefs and acquire knowledge 
of the world. 1 Nevertheless relations between science and Christian 
belief have often been a bit strained, most particularly since the develop-
ment of evolutionary biology beginning in the nineteenth century. And 
a fundamental question for a Christian theist-in particular, one who 
takes the Bible as authoritative-is this: how should we think about sci-
ence generally? If there appears to be a conflict between a Christian 
belief and some bit of contemporary science, what should we do? 
Which (if either) should we jettison or modify? More specifically, how 
should we think about evolutionary biology? Suppose you are a 
Christian: should that make a difference to how you think about or prac-
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tice science in general? That's the broad underlying question; there is 
also a more specific and perhaps more poignant question, namely, how 
should a Christian theist think about evolutionary biology? 
I addressed this latter question in "When Faith and Reason Clash: 
Evolution and the Bible" (1991a). Ernan McMullin found himself in con-
siderable disagreement and responded with "Plantinga's Defense of 
Special Creation" (1991), to which I replied with "Evolution, Neutrality, 
and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to van Till and McMullin" (1991b);2 
McMullin's riposte was "Evolution and Special Creation" (1993)3. I note 
with pleasure the deep underlying agreement between McMullin and 
myself; nevertheless there remain some points of equally deep differ-
ence. These issues are of great importance, both intrinsically and for the 
intellectual health of the Christian community; I therefore propose to 
continue the discussion. However I shall forgo line by line self-exculpa-
tion in order to look at some of the issues from a perspective untram-
meled by the need to prove that wherever McMullin and I disagree, he 
must of course be wrong. In part I, I shall address some issues revolving 
around the notion of Augustinian science; in part II, I shall briefly address 
the question of the antecedent and consequent probability of the Grand 
Evolutionary Scenario, given Christian theism as background belief. 
I Augustinian Science 
According to St. Augustine, human history is the arena of a great con-
test, a struggle or conflict between two profoundly opposed forces. 
Augustine spoke of the City of God and the Earthly City or City of the 
World: the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Mundi. In 1991a and elsewhere4 T 
argued that there is indeed such a struggle or competition: as a matter of 
fact it is a three-way contest between theism, perennial naturalism, and 
creative anti-realism. I argued that the sciences are by no means wholly 
neutral with respect to this contest; much of what goes on in them-par-
ticularly in the so-called human sciences including economics, psycholo-
gy, sociology, political science, parts of sociobiology, etc., but also in 
biology-proceeds from the assumption of a sort of metaphysical or reli-
gious naturalism. (Put simply but vaguely, metaphysical naturalism is 
the view that nature is all there is: there is no such person as God or any-
one at all like him.S) But this means that the Christian community can't 
automatically take the word of the scientific experts; sometimes what the 
experts say presupposes a philosophical or religious stance quite 
opposed to that of Christian theism. I therefore suggested the Christian 
community needs two things here. First, it needs cultural criticism, or 
perhaps consciousness raising, which is a matter of coming to a clear 
vision of the ways in which metaphysical naturalism ingresses into sci-
ence-or at any rate into what is ordinarily called science. And second, 
the Christian community ought to think about the subject matter of the 
various sciences-again, in particular the human sciences, but also to 
some degree the so-called natural sciences-from an explicitly theistic or 
Christian point of view. It should do so, of course, only where that is 
relevant: only where it looks as if thinking about the matter at hand 
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from that point of view might lead to conclusions or emphases different 
from those ordinarily to be found. I suggested calling the result 
'Unnatural Science', or 'Creation Science', or Theistic Science'. A better 
name, I think, is "Augustinian Science", which recalls Augustine's sug-
gestion that serious intellectual activity in general is ordinarily in the 
service of a broadly religious vision of the world. 
A. Why do we Need Augustinian Science? 
Fundamentally, because much of what goes on in the sciences is quite 
unsatisfactory, seriously flawed from the perspective of Christian the-
ism. There are many examples, especially from psychology, sociology, 
sociobiology, political science, and other areas of the human sciences. 
Here I give one from sociobiology and a couple from evolutionary biolo-
gy, the area where the disagreement between McMullin and me has 
been focused. 
1. Simon and Rationality 
According to Herbert Simon/ there is a problem with altruistic behav-
ior, the sort characteristic of Mother Teresa, or The Little Sisters of the 
Poor, or the Jesuit missionaries of the 17th century, or the Methodist 
missionaries of the 19th. The rational way to behave, says Simon, is to 
act or try to act in such a way as to increase one's personal fitness, i. e., 
to act so as to increase the probability that one's genes will be widely 
disseminated in the next and subsequent generations, thus doing well in 
the evolutionary derby.7 Mother Teresa and The Little Sisters, however, 
show very little interest in the propagation of their genes; this behavior 
clearly requires explanation; so what is its explanation? Simon proposes 
two mechanisms: "bounded rationality", and" docility": 
Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive oth-
ers in the society want them to learn and believe. Thus the con-
tent of what is learned will not be fully screened for its contribu-
tion to personal fitness (p. 1666). 
Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be 
unable to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes 
to fitness from altruistic behavior. In fact, docility will reduce the 
inclination to evaluate independently the contributions of behav-
ior to fitness. . ... By virtue of bounded rationality, the docile per-
son cannot acquire the personally advantageous learning that pro-
vides the increment, d, of fitness without acquiring also the altruis-
tic behaviors that cost the decrement, c (p. 1667). 
The idea is that a Mother Teresa displays "bounded rationality"; she 
adopts those culturally transmitted altruistic behaviors without making 
an independent evaluation of their contribution to her personal fitness. 
If she did make such an independent evaluation (and were clever 
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enough to do it properly) she would see that this sort of behavior does 
not contribute to her personal fitness, drop it like a hot potato, and get to 
work on increasing her fitness (perhaps by sponsoring a contest, among 
her younger relatives, to see who can have the most children). 
But isn't this in clear conflict with Christian teachings about what it is 
rational for human beings to do? Behaving like Mother Teresa is not at 
all a manifestation of "bounded rationality"-as if, if she thought about 
the matter with greater clarity and penetration, she would instead act so 
as to increase her personal fitness. Behaving as she does is instead a 
manifestation of a Christ-like spirit; she is reflecting in her limited 
human way the splendid glory of Christ's sacrificial action in the 
Atonement. Indeed, is there any sense of 'rational' in which, from a 
Christian perspective, there is anything at all a human being can do that 
is more rational than what she does? 
Of course we might be tempted to claim that Simon's project really 
isn't science; but can we sensibly make that claim in these post-Kuhnian 
days? If the scientists call it science and get grants from the National 
Science Foundation for doing it, if it is published in scientific journals 
and written in that stiff, impersonal style characteristic of them, can we 
sensibly claim that it really isn't science? So here we have an example of 
a scientific project that, from a Christian perspective, is wholly misguid-
ed. It is, perhaps, a particularly flagrant example, but there are many 
others in the same neighborhood.8 
2. Randomness and design 
The next examples are taken from evolutionary biology, the specific 
area under dispute between McMullin and me. One of the most conspic-
uous examples of serious confusion on the part of some of the experts is 
the claim that current evolutionary theory demonstrates, or at any rates 
supports, the claim that human beings are not the product of intelligent 
design; they have not been designed by God or anyone else. A number 
of the most prominent writers on evolution unite in declaring that evolu-
tionary biology reveals a substantial element of randomness or chance in 
the origin and development of the human species; therefore, human 
beings (so they claim) have not been designed. Stephen Gould writes: 
"Before Darwin, we thought that a benevolent God had created US."9 
Gould's sentiments are expressed less tersely by Douglas Futuyma: 
By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, 
uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological 
or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous. 
Together with Marx's materialistic theory of history and society 
and Freud's attribution of human behavior to processes over 
which we have little control, Darwin's theory of evolution was a 
crucial plank in the platform of mechanism and materialism-of 
much of science, in short-that has since been the stage of most 
Western thought.10 
Clearer yet, perhaps, is George Gaylord Simpson: 
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Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already 
evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life 
can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of 
the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors. They are 
readily explicable on the basis of differential reproduction in 
populations (the main factor in the modern conception of natur-
al selection) and of the mainly random interplay of the known 
processes of heredity. ... Man is the result of a purposeless and 
natural process that did not have him in mind.l1 
The same claim is made by Richard Dawkins: 
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature 
is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special 
way. A true watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and 
springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose 
in his mind's eye. Natural selection, the blind, unconscious 
automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we 
now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently 
purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no 
mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has 
no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play 
the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker. 12 
These writers, therefore, unite in declaring that modern evolutionary sci-
ence has given us powerful reason to believe that human beings are, in 
an important way, merely accidental; that there are such creatures as 
human beings (creatures with the properties human beings display) is 
fortuitious, a matter of chance. There wasn't any plan, any foresight, 
any mind, any mind's eye involved in their coming into being or dis-
playing the properties they have. 
Now this is initially surprising: how would an empirical science show 
something like that? Could there be empirical evidence for it? But in fact 
there is confusion here. Evolutionary science speaks of 'randomness': 
random genetic mutation, for example. Now these events are 'random' 
in something like the sense of not arising from the proper function of the 
organism; more specifically, they are not a result of the organism's func-
tioning in accord with any part of its design plan aimed at promoting or 
preserving its welfare. Thus Ernst Mayr: "The term, when applied to 
variation, means that it is not in a response to the needs of the organism". 
But the conclusion the above writers draw depends upon taking 'ran-
dom' in a much stronger sense, a sense entailing not supervised, orchestrat-
ed, caused, or planned by God. As far as I can see, they simply confuse these 
two senses, leaping lightly from one to the other. This simple confusion, 
obviously, has enormous capacity for mischief; it can lead the unwary to 
think science has somehow shown that human beings were not designed 
by God and that their most crucial and characteristic capacities have 
arisen, not by way of divine design, but by way of chance or accident. 
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Someone might reply that the evidence for a theory is in its success, 
and evolutionary theory, taken with the stronger sense of 'random', is a 
highly successful theory with much empirical confirmation. By way of 
response, note that there are two versions of the relevant scientific theo-
ry here. The first and stronger version includes the claim that random 
events in the strong sense (the sense that entails being unplanned by 
God) playa crucial role in evolution; the second and weaker makes the 
same claim with respect to random events in the weaker sense of 'ran-
dom'. Now consider the conjunction of the weak theory with the denial 
of the strong; and note that this conjunction is supported by the evi-
dence at least as firmly as is the strong theory itself. Hence the evidence 
supports the strong theory no more firmly than its denial; hence it does-
n't give us a reason to believe that theory as opposed to its denial. You 
might as well argue for theism by conjoining it with, say, relativity theo-
ryor quantum mechanics, pointing out that the resulting conjunction is 
empirically adequate; few, I take it, would regard that as much of a rea-
son for starting to go to church. But the above confusion is no better rea-
son for staying home. 
3. TCA and the genetic code 
One of the elements of the Grand Evolutionary Scenario is TCA, the 
Theory of Common Ancestry, the thesis that life originated at just one 
place on earth, all subsequent living creatures being related by descent 
to that aboriginal form. This is the claim, as Stephen Gould puts it, that 
there is a "tree of evolutionary descent linking all organisms by ties of 
genealogy".13 According to TCA, you and I are literally cousins of allliv-
ing things-horses, bats, poison ivy and bacteria-distant cousins, no 
doubt, but still cousins. It is now rather widely conceded that the fossil 
record is not at all what one would expect on the conjunction of TCA 
and any presently known candidate-mechanism for evolution. The 
record typically displays sudden appearance and subsequent stasis, and 
few if any intermediate forms between the major taxa. There are no 
intermediary forms in the fossil record leading up to the first representa-
tives of the phyla; and indeed much the same goes at the level of class. 
There are few even remotely plausible candidates, in the fossil record, 
for intermediates between fish and amphibia, amphibia and reptiles, 
reptiles and birds, reptiles and mammals, and the like. 14 
Lately, however, it has become popular to pooh-pooh this kind of 
consideration, claiming that the really important evidence is to be found 
at the molecular level. This evidence has come to light only recently, in 
the enormous explosion of information produced by the biochemistry 
and molecular biology of the last 30 years or so. In particular, so the 
claim goes, the conclusive evidence for TCA is the fact that all forms of 
life from the prokaryotes (bacteria, blue-green algae) on up employ the 
very same genetic code (the code by which nucleic acid specifies the 
structures of proteins). Thus Ernst Mayr: 
Everything we have learned about the physiology and chemistry 
of organisms supports Darwin's daring speculation that "all the 
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organic beings who have ever lived on this earth have descended 
from some one primordial form, into which life was first 
breathed" (Origin of Species, London, Murray (1964 facsimile edi-
tion) p. 484). The discovery that the prokaryotes have the same 
genetic code as the higher organisms was the most decisive con-
firmation of Darwin's hypothesis. A historical unity in the entire 
living world cannot help but have a deep meaning for any think-
ing person and for his feeling toward fellow organisms.lS 
But here there is confusion. Given naturalism, this is possibly a just 
estimate of the probabilities; that is, if we take naturalism as part of our 
background information, then perhaps it is plausible to take a common 
genetic code!6 as conclusive evidence for TCA. This is plausible in part 
just because (a) it is so hard to see how life could have come into exis-
tence at all just by virtue of the regularities studied in physics and chem-
istry, and (b) if by some wild chance it did arise more than once, it isn't 
likely that it would stumble on the same genetic code a second time. 
Given theism, however, things are very different. For given theism as 
background information, one possibility is TCA, but another is God's 
having created some forms of life specially-the original forms, perhaps, 
or the first representatives of the phyla, or the first representatives of 
some of the classes, or human beings. Christians can't rule this out 
merely because some of the experts seem to find the very idea of special 
divine creation somehow obscene and worthy only of contempt. 
The fact-if indeed it is a fact-that all of life displays the same genetic 
code is very much to be expected on TCA and hence confirms it--con-
firms it in the sense that it raises its antecedent probability. But of course 
a common code is perfectly compatible with God's having created some 
forms of organic life specially; surely nothing would oblige him to use 
different genetic codes for different kinds of life. If special divine cre-
ation is one of the possibilities, therefore, the discovery that all forms of 
life use the same genetic code couldn't possibly be a "decisive confirma-
tion" of TCA. It raises the antecedent probability of that hypothesis; but 
it doesn't by itself raise it high enough for decisive confirmation unless it 
lowers the probability of each of the rival hypotheses (and indeed of 
their disjunction) to much less than a half. But it doesn't-not, at least, 
given theism and the possibility that God would create some forms of life 
specially.!7 We can say, I think, that the common code confirms TCA 
more than it confirms special creation: that is, it raises the antecedent 
probability of TCA more than that of special creation (so far as I can see, 
it doesn't raise the latter at all). But of course that doesn't so much as 
slyly suggest either that special creation is improbable, given the com-
mon code, or that TCA is more probable all told (e.g., given the common 
code and the rest of the empirical evidence) than special creation. Mayr 
seems to be confusing the probability of TCA on the empirical evidence 
plus naturalism with its probability on the empirical evidence alone. 
4. Is TCA "Certain"? 
Many of the experts tell us that evolution-TCA, at the least-is ccrtainl8 
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with respect to the empirical evidence, as certain as that the earth revolves 
around the sun rather than vice versa. But (as I argued in 1991a) this seems 
to be at best wild exaggeration. There are the problems with the fossil 
record: the great gaps and the fact that there aren't any documented or 
uncontroversial examples of macro evolution. There is also Mivart's old 
objection:19 as Mivart saw, the mammalian eye (for example) is an extraordi-
narily complex and functionally integrated structure, its various parts inti-
mately dependent upon each other for their function. He pointed out how 
difficult it is to envision a series of organic forms leading up to the eye from 
creatures without eyes, where each step on the path through that space 
must be both close enough to the preceding step to be plausibly reachable in 
a single step, and also adaptive or at any rate not unduly maladaptive. 
(Although this objection was one of the first, it has never really been 
answered; people have just grown accustomed to living with it.) Indeed, it 
isn't really known that such a series is so much as biologically possible. 
There is also Michael Behe's new and vastly more powerful version of 
Mivart's objection (see below, p. 389). 
Here McMullin reminds me that the evidence for TCA is necessarily 
incomplete: " ... evolutionary explanation is of its nature historical and 
historical explanation is not like explanation in physics or chemistry. It 
deals with the singular and the unrepeatable; it is thus necessarily incom-
plete" (322). This is true, and important; but of course an hypothesis for 
which the evidence is necessarily weak is still one for which the evidence 
is weak. It is also part of my point; it is (partly) for this reason that it is 
absurd to claim that TCA is certain; those strident declarations of cer-
tainty must come from some source other than a cool, reasoned, dispas-
sionate look at the evidence. Perhaps these writers have a philosophical 
or religious ax to grind, or perhaps they confuse TCA's being the best 
available hypothesis (or the best available hypothesis that conforms to 
the demands of methodological naturalism) with its being certain; more 
likely, perhaps they confuse the epistemic probability of TCA on the 
empirical evidence with its probability on that evidence together with 
naturalism. Whatever the problem, this assessment of the evidence is 
again wholly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of Christian theism; it is 
another reason why Christians must make their own estimates here, 
rather than blindly following the experts. 
There are plenty of other examples from this area. For example, the 
famous zoologist G. G. Simpson poses the question "What is man?"; he 
answers, ''The point I want to make now is that all attempts to answer that 
question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we 
ignore them completely".20 And of course there are many examples from 
the social sciences. The great psychologist Jean Piaget asserts that a seven-
year-old child whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly will 
believe that everything in the universe has a purpose in some grand overar-
ching plan or design; a mature person whose faculties are functioning prop-
erly, however, will learn to "think scientifically" and realize that everything 
has either a natural cause or happens by chance.21 There is also the assump-
tion, widely current in scientific (sociological, psychological) study of reli-
gion, that serious religious belief must be a manifestation of pathology, stu-
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pidity, backwardness, or invincible ignorance. And my point is that in 
these areas the Christian intellectual community has a stake in noting that 
these claims-that human beings are not designed, that the common genet-
ic code decisively confirms TCA, that TCA is certain, and so on-are not at 
all established by the empirical evidence. It has a stake in noting the role 
that naturalism or other broadly religious views play in the acceptance and 
dissemination of these claims. And it should work at some of these areas-
particularly in the human sciences but in evolutionary biology as well-
from the perspective of Christian theism. That is, it should pursue these sci-
ences by starting from the basic tenets of Christianity, taking them as part of 
the constant contextual background with respect to which the plausibility 
and probability of scientific hypotheses and claims are to be evaluated. 
B. Objections to Augustinian Science 
Now as far as I can see, McMullin agrees that the Christian community 
should pursue something like Augustinian science. He recognizes that there 
could indeed be conflict between scientific theories and the deliverances of 
the Christian faith, what Christians learn from the Bible; he thinks that "the 
context where differences of this kind might properly occur seems restricted 
to issues concerning human nature"; and he mentions psychological or psy-
choanalytical theories that deny "human free choice and the consequent 
moral responsibility for actions performed". So perhaps McMullin would 
agree that the Christian community needs Augustinian science in these 
areas. He is deeply suspicious of this approach, however, in evolutionary 
biology and allied areas: 
It is this casting of special creation and evolution as rivals in the 
domain of cosmological explanation that I find so troubling. If one 
assumes that there is a presumption in favor of some sort of special 
creation at the critical moments in the historical development of life (a 
presumption whose plausibility wanes in regard to specific transi-
tions as the strength of the evolutionary explanation of those transi-
tions increases) one inevitably transforms the field of prehistory into a 
battleground where the religious believer is engaged in constant skir-
mishes with the protagonists of evolutionary-type theories, skirmish-
es that most often end in forced retreat for the religious believer (313). 
Augustinian science, he says, 
certainly ensures conflict; it is likely to maximize the strain 
between faith and reason, as the believer searches for the expect-
ed gaps in the scientific account (p. 313). 
Here, I think, there is both misapprehension and error. 
1. Faith and Reason. 
First, the failure of communication. McMullin believes that pursuing 
Augustinian science here "is likely to maximize the strain between faith 
and reason". But why so? A strain between faith and reason is a possi-
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bility, of course, only for someone (or some community) that accepts the 
Christian faith, and then only if some deliverance of faith is in tension 
with some deliverance of reason. So far as I can see, however, the 
Christian faith doesn't teach us that TCA is false, and reason doesn't 
teach us that it is true. (Maybe reason plus naturalism does, but that is 
another matter entirely.) The believer needn't be anxious about TCA, or 
desperately eager to refute it. What is clear, from the point of view of 
Christian theism, is that the Lord has created the heavens and the earth 
and all that is in them; there is no particular way of doing so, however, 
such that it is clear that he did it in that way. It is also not clear that he 
didn't do so by way of TCA. (Perhaps he did something different and 
special in creating our first parents; that is quite compatible with their 
having descended from nonhuman forms of life.) As far as I can see, the 
proper attitude for Christians to take, towards TCA, is a sort of genial 
skepticism; maybe things happened that way, but then again maybe not. 
Indeed, as I argued above, it is the naturalist who has a real stake here. 
Evolution is the only answer anyone can think of to what would other-
wise be a very embarrassing question; it is this that calls forth all those 
declarations of certainty. 
And hence it is not the case that the believer need spend a lot of time 
"searching for the expected gaps in the scientific account", frantically 
looking for holes in the latest evolutionary theories. First, of course, 
there is no need to go searching for those gaps; the absence of transitional 
forms in the fossil record is one of its salient features. But more impor-
tant, the believer, so far as I can see, has no particular stake in the out-
come here. The Augustinian or theistic scientist has a certain freedom 
denied her naturalistic compeer: she can follow the evidence where it 
leads. If it leads towards TCA, no problem; God could surely have done 
things that way if he wished. If it leads away from it, again, no problem; 
God could also have done things by way of episodes of special creation, 
or in still other ways.22 It is the naturalist who has a real stake in evolu-
tion, not the theist. My point is only that in deciding on the right epis-
temic attitude to take to TCA, Darwinism, and the rest, the Christian sci-
entific community should use all that it knows, including what it knows 
by faith. In particular, it should use the idea that it is God who in one 
way or another has created life, and he certainly could have done so by 
way of episodes of special creation. 
So far as I can seen, therefore, Augustinian science doesn't at all 
"maximize the strain between faith and reason". Indeed, it should do 
just the reverse. In doing Augustinian science, you start by assuming 
the deliverances of the faith, employing them along with anything else 
you know in dealing with a given scientific problem or project. Conflict 
between faith and reason can certainly occur; but it is less likely to occur, 
I think, than if the scientific investigation is insulated from the deliver-
ances of the faith and left to develop of its own accord. 
2. Academic Trespass? 
McMullin points out that Augustinian science crosses contemporary 
academic boundaries; the theologian and scientist may find themselves 
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at loggerheads, bandying about charges of academic trespass. Given the 
present organization of the disciplines, this seems correct: Augustinian 
science, at least at first, will certainly involve people's making pro-
nouncements or claims outside their areas of special competence. This is 
a real point, and has to be taken with real seriousness; in writing on 
these areas, I do myself certainly feel acute discomfort at venturing 
beyond the areas where I might be thought to know something about 
what I am talking about. 
But as things presently stand, this kind of trespass is inevitable, at least if 
we propose to think about the broader involvements and significance of a 
theory like the Grand Evolutionary Scenario, or Darwinism, or TCA. We 
will inevitably stray outside our areas of competence, as Futuyma, Gould 
and others do in claiming that contemporary evolutionary theory shows that 
human beings are not designed, or as G. G. Simpson does in declaring that 
nothing on the nature of man written before 1859 is worth reading. There is 
no way to address the important questions here without getting outside our 
areas of competence. The alternative would be not to think about these mat-
ters-{)r if we think about them, not to speak or write about them. That 
seems to me a counsel that is dangerous as well as unduly diffident. The 
Christian community needs to know how to think about these matters. We 
must address them with all the care, insight and depth we can muster. 
Failing to do so will leave us likely to be misled, likely to think, e.g., that 
there really is something like a scientific quasi-demonstration that we are not 
designed by God, but are rather a product of chance or accident. It will leave 
us easily misled into thinking we really must understand what is most 
essential about us-love, morality, religion, altruism, art, literature, music, 
love of adventure, play, humor, intellectual curiosity, capacity for physics, 
philosophy and evolutionary biology-in broadly Darwinian terms. That 
way lies intellectual disaster for the Christian community. 
And in any event, how can I rationally refrain from using all that I know 
in assessing the probability of a theory like TeA, in trying to come to the 
proper doxastic attitude towards it? Is it worthy of belief? of disbelief? Or 
should we instead be agnostic about it? If the later, how probable is it? Is it 
much more or much less probable than its denial? Or is it instead approxi-
mately in the same neighborhood? In answering these questions, how can I 
sensibly refrain from using all that I know, including what I know by faith? 
3. Is Augustinian Science 'Science'? 
McMullin displays a certain sympathy with a project somewhere in 
the neighborhood of Augustinian science; however he doesn't think the 
result should be called 'science' (or perhaps what he thinks is that the 
result really isn't science, whatever we call it): 
I do not think, however, that theistic science [Augustinian sci-
ence] should be described as science. It lacks the universality of 
science, as that term has been understood in the later Western 
tradition. It also lacks the sort of warrant that has gradually 
come to characterize a properly "scientific" knowledge of 
nature, one that favors systematic observation, generalization, 
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and the testing of explanatory hypotheses. Theistic science 
appeals to a specifically Christian belief, one that lays no claim 
to assent from a Hindu or an agnostic. . ... To use the term sci-
ence in this connection seems dangerously misleading; it encour-
ages expectations that cannot be fulfilled (303). 
Now in a way it doesn't matter what we call this enterprise that (as 
McMullin and I agree) ought to be undertaken by the Christian commu-
nity. And no doubt we would agree further that it is the scientists of the 
Christian community, the practitioners of the disciplines in question, 
who ought to undertake it. But there is something (research grants, for 
example) in a name, and I thoroughly disagree with McMullin's reasons 
for denying the name 'science' to this enterprise. He makes two points. 
First, Augustinian science, he says, lacks the universality of what is nowa-
days called 'science'; it couldn't be practiced by an agnostic or a Hindu. 
And second, it lacks "the sort of warrant that points to systematic obser-
vation, generalization, and the testing of explanatory hypotheses" (303). 
But is it really true that what is nowadays called 'science' is universal, in 
McMullin's sense? Certainly not. Remember Herbert Simon's account of 
rationality and his treatment of altruism;23 no Christian theist could either 
accept that account of rationality or (initially) acquiesce in the conclusion 
that altruistic behavior is a result of unusual docility and 'limited' rationali-
ty?4 Simon's project is surely not universal; it doesn't start from and admit 
as premises only propositions everyone--Jew, Christian, Hindu or agnos-
tic-already accepts or is prepared to accept. Not by a long shot. Similarly 
for the claims that a common genetic code is decisive evidence for TCA, for 
the claim that current evolutionary science supports the conclusion that 
human beings are not designed by God, for the Piagettian claim that the 
mature person realizes that everything has either a natural cause or else 
happens by chance, for the assumption that serious religious belief is patho-
logical or a result of stupidity, unusual backwardness, or social disorder, 
and the like. All of these claims are assumed or accepted in one scientific 
project or another-i.e., in one or another project to which the term 'science' 
is commonly applied; but none of them is universal in McMullin's sense. I 
conclude that McMullin is mistaken here: the term 'science' is not currently 
used in such a way that it applies only to projects universal in that sense; 
hence we don't have here an objection to applying the term 'science' to 
Augustinian science. 
As for the second point (that Augustinian science wouldn't involve 
observation, generalization and the testing of hypotheses characteristic 
of science) here there is misunderstanding. The way to try to under-
stand, from a theistic perspective, how God created plants and animals 
and human beings is to take account of all that you know: what you 
know by faith, what you know as a Christian, as well as what you know 
in other ways. In the case at hand, the relevant considerations would be 
what, if anything, Scripture teaches or suggests on the matter, together 
with the antecedent probability of, e.g., TeA from a theistic perspective, 
together with the 'empirical evidence': the fossil record, the molecular 
evidence, homologies, and the like. Clearly this involves precisely the 
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sort of systematic observation, generalization and testing of explanatory 
hypotheses that McMullin cites as the hallmark of science. It may 
involve more; but it certainly involves this much. To establish his point, 
McMullin would have to argue something else: that science (properly 
so-called) somehow couldn't involve those other matters, the looking to 
see what (if anything) Scripture says on the matter, the consideration of 
the antecedent probability of a theory on theism and so on. And I 
haven't the faintest idea how that could be argued. Where is it laid 
down that anything that does that is not science? 
The answer, McMullin thinks, lies in the methodological naturalism he 
thinks essential to natural science: the idea, to put it crudely, that in sci-
ence we ought not to appeal to what we know about God, or his activity, 
or to what we know by way of the testimony of Scripture.25 Speaking of 
methodological naturalism, he writes, "Scientists have to proceed in this 
way; the methodology of natural science gives no purchase on the claim 
that a particular event or type of event is to be explained by invoking 
God's 'special' action or calling on the testimony of Scripture" (303). But 
where does this embargo come from? It is ordinarily supported only by 
bad arguments of the type "God is not part of the universe; in science 
we can only refer to parts of the universe; therefore .... "; or even "To 
refer to God in science is to treat God as an object, which is idolatry; 
therefore .... " Why believe that scientists have to proceed the way 
McMullin says they have to? 
Consider, for example, the question how life originated: theists know 
that God created it in one way or another, and now the question is: how 
did he do it? Did he do it by way of the ordinary regularities or laws of 
physics and chemistry (the ordinary behavior of matter, so far as we 
understand it) or did he do something special? If, after considerable 
study, we can't see how it could possibly have happened by way of 
those regularities-if, as is in fact the case, after many decades of study 
the enormous complexity and functional connectedness and integrity of 
even the simplest forms of life make it look increasingly unlikely that 
they could have originated in that way-the natural thing to think, from 
the perspective of Christian theism, is that probably God did something 
different and special here. (Such a conclusion, of course, would not be 
written in stone. All we can say is that it is likely with respect to our pre-
sent evidence; perhaps things will change; the inquiry is never closed.) 
And why couldn't one draw this conclusion precisely as a scientist? 
Where is it written that such a conclusion can't be part of science? Why 
should we accept methodological naturalism? 
4. Duhemian Science 
Pierre Duhem has an interesting answer26-the best answer I know. 
Duhem was both a serious Catholic and a serious scientist; he was 
accused (as he saw it) by Abel Rey27 of allowing his religious and meta-
physical views as a Christian to enter his physics in an improper way. 
Duhem rejected the accusation, claiming that his Christianity didn't 
enter his physics in an improper way, because it didn't enter his physics 
in any way at alUR Furthermore, he thought the correct or proper way to 
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pursue physical theory was the way in which he claimed to have done 
it; physical theory should be completely independent of religious or 
metaEhysical views or commitments. Why so? Fundamentally, he 
says, Y because otherwise the disagreements that run riot in metaphysics 
will ingress into physics, so that the latter cannot be an activity we can 
all work at together, regardless of our metaphysical views: 
Now to make physical theories depend on metaphysics is surely 
not the way to let them enjoy the privilege of universal consent. 
. . .. If theoretical physics is subordinated to metaphysics, the 
divisions separating the diverse metaphysical systems will 
extend into the domain of physics. A physical theory reputed to 
be satisfactory by the sectarians of one metaphysical school will 
be rejected by the partisans of another school. 
The point he makes is that if a physical theorist employs metaphysical 
assumptions that are not accepted by other workers in the field, and 
employs them in such a way that those who don't accept them can't 
accept his physical theory, then to that extent his work cannot be accept-
ed by those others; and to that extent the cooperation important to sci-
ence will be compromised. He therefore proposes a conception of sci-
ence (of physics in particular) according to which the latter is indepen-
dent of metaphysics: 
... I have denied metaphysical doctrines the right to testify for 
or against any physical theory. .... Whatever I have said of 
the method by which physics proceeds, or the nature and scope 
that we must attribute to the theories it constructs, does not in 
any way prejudice either the metaphysical doctrines or religious 
beliefs of anyone who accepts my words. The believer and the 
nonbeliever may both work in common accord for the progress 
of physical science such as I have tried to define it (p. 274-75). 
So here we have another argument against Augustinian science and for 
methodological naturalism, an argument with an appealing simplicity: it is 
important that we all-Christian, naturalist, agnostic, whoever-be able to 
work at physics and the other sciences together and cooperatively; there-
fore we shouldn't employ, in science, views, commitments and assump-
tions only some of us accept. But then we can't employ (in that way) such 
ideas as that the world and the things therein have been designed and cre-
ated by God; that is a commitment only some of us accept. Proper science, 
insofar as it is to be common to all of us, will have to eschew any depen-
dence upon metaphysical and religious views held by only some of us; 
therefore we should endorse methodological naturalism. We do not, of 
course, have to be metaphysical naturalists in order to pursue Duhemian sci-
ence; but if science is to be properly universal, it can't employ assumptions 
or commitments that are not universally shared. 
This argument is pragmatic, not principial: it is a good thing to do sci-
ence together; we should therefore maximize the possibility of coopera-
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tion and cooperative inquiry wherever possible; therefore we should not 
employ, in science, theories or assumptions essentially involving beliefs 
that are not common to us all. Duhemian science, you might say, would 
be public science; it would be maximally inclusive and wholly neutral 
with respect to the world-view differences that separate us. And of 
course there are vast stretches of our cognitive economy where these 
world-view considerations do indeed seem to be quite irrelevant. 
Anyone with decent eyesight will see that the pointer points to 7; meta-
physics and theology have nothing to do with it. The same will hold for 
a measurement of the distance from Earth to Jupiter. Anybody (with the 
possible exception of a few paralogicians from Australia) will see that a 
contradiction can't be true; again, it doesn't matter whether you are the-
ist, naturalist, anti-realist or whatever. The same will go for a deduction 
of Cantor's Theorem from the axioms of ordinary set theory. (Of course 
disagreement may break out about those axioms.) 
Duhemian science, obviously enough, would involve methodological 
naturalism: no hypotheses involving God, or sin, or what one knows by 
special revelation will enter essentially into the constitution of such sci-
ence. But here is the crucially important point: from the Duhemian 
point of view, methodological naturalism will be just one small part of a 
much more inclusive constraint. Science, so conceived, will not employ 
hypotheses about God, but it also won't employ any hypotheses whose 
cogency involves or presupposes metaphysical naturalism. Nor will it employ 
assumptions like those that seem to underlie much cognitive science. It 
couldn't, for example, properly assume that mind-body dualism is false, 
or that human beings are material objects, these being metaphysical 
assumptions that divide us. Nor could it employ the deterministic 
assumptions that seem to underlie much social science; these beliefs also 
relevantly divide us. Further, many assumptions about what constitutes 
proper function on the part of human beings and their faculties would 
have to be proscribed: for example, Simonian assumptions about what is 
and isn't rational, Piagettian claims about what a mature (and properly 
functioning) adult will believe, as well as the assumption that serious 
religious belief must be explained as a manifestation of pathology, stu-
pidity or invincible ignorance. Further, Duhemian science would pro-
scribe the idea that the Theory of Common Ancestry is certain, as well as 
the idea that the randomness or chance involved in genetic variation is 
such as to preclude human beings' having been designed-by God or 
anyone else. It is important to see how much of what goes on under the 
title of science is not Duhemian. 
Duhemian science has much to be said for it and should surely be 
encouraged. But what about those who, like Simon, for example, think 
it is important also to do a sort of human science which starts, not mere-
ly from methodological naturalism, but from metaphysical naturalism? 
And what about those who, like Duhem's atomists, Cartesians and 
Aristotelians, think it is important to pursue a sort of science in which 
the aim is successful explanation in terms of underlying unobservable 
realities? And what about Christians or theists, who propose to investi-
gate human reality employing all that they know, including what they 
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know as Christians or theists? So far as Duhem's claims go, there is 
nothing in the least improper about any of this. Should we call this kind 
of activity 'science'; does it deserve that honorific term? There is no rea-
son in Duhem for a negative answer. It is important, to be sure, to see 
that science of this sort isn't Duhemian science and doesn't have the 
claim to universal assent enjoyed by the latter; but of course that is noth-
ing against it. According to the fuller Duhemian picture, then, we 
would all work together on Duhemian science; but each of the groups 
involved-naturalists and theists, for example, but perhaps others as 
well-could then go on to incorporate Duhemian science into a fuller 
context that includes the metaphysical or religious principles specific to 
that group. The motivation for doing so, naturally enough, will vary 
from area to area. Physics, and chemistry are overwhelmingly 
Duhemian (of course the same isn't true for philosophy of physics); here 
perhaps Augustinian science would be for the most part otiose. 
Something similar goes for biological sciences: surely much that goes on 
there could be thought of as Duhemian science, although that area also 
contains the non-Duhemian elements we have already noted. In the 
human sciences, however, vast stretches are clearly non-Duhemian; it is 
in these areas that Augustinian science would be most relevant and 
important. 
So return to the current question: should the Christian scientific com-
munity observe the constraints of methodological naturalism? So far as 
this argument is concerned, the answer seems to be: yes, of course, in 
those areas where Duhemian science is possible and valuable. But noth-
ing here suggests that the Christian scientific community should not also 
pursue non-Duhemian Augustinian science where that is relevant. 
There is nothing here to suggest that if it ain't Duhemian, it ain't science. 
II Probabilities: Antecedent and Consequent 
A. God: Classicist or Romantic? 
The antecedent probability of a thesis or hypothesis, for you, is its 
epistemic probability30 on your background information, prior to or 
independent of consideration of the particular evidence at hand. I 
argued that the antecedent probability of evolution with respect to natu-
ralism is very different from its antecedent probability with respect to 
Christian theism; in fact, T said, the antecedent probability of TCA, for 
the Christian theist, is less than that of its denial. Here McMullin digs in 
his heels; here, he says, is where he and I "really part ways". 
In order to address this issue properly, we need a couple of distinc-
tions. First, suppose we use the phrase 'The Grand Evolutionary Scenario' 
(GES) to denote the conjunction of four theses: (a) the 'Naturalistic Origins 
Thesis' according to which life arose from non life just by way of the regu-
larities of physics and chemistry, (b) the 'Progress Thesis', according to 
which life has progressed from relatively simple unicellular forms3! to rel-
atively complex forms, culminating, as we human beings like to think, in 
us, (c) TCA, according to which life originated at one place on earth, all 
subsequent living creatures being related by descent to those aboriginal 
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creatures, and (d) Darwinism, the claim that these enormous changes 
occurred by way of the accretion of many small steps and that the mecha-
nisms driving the enormous changes occurring since the origin of life are 
broadly Darwinian (for starters, natural selection working on some source 
of variation such as random genetic mutation). 
Now the epistemic probability of a theory such as CES or TCA is of 
course relative to a body of background belief or knowledge. I argued 
that the antecedent probability of CES on naturalism is high. For the 
naturalist, evolution is the only game in town, the only answer anyone 
can think of to the questions, Where did this teeming variety of flora and 
fauna come from? How did it get here? And what accounts for that 
appearance of design it displays? The theist has an easy answer: in one 
way or another, the Lord created all these creatures (why else are they 
called 'creatures'?). But that answer is not available to the naturalist; it is 
CES that gives an answer to this otherwise embarrassing question. 
Hence Richard Dawkins' remark to A. J. Ayer at one of those elegantly 
candle-lit and splendidly bibulous Oxford college dinners: he said he 
couldn't imagine being an atheist before 1859 (the year Darwin's Origin 
of Species was published); "although atheism might have been logically 
tenable before Darwin", said he, "Darwin made it possible to be an intel-
lectually fulfilled atheist".32 I doubt that it is possible to be an intellectu-
ally fulfilled atheist, but Dawkins' essential point is right: CES is a rea-
sonably plausible answer to the above question, and the only reasonably 
plausible answer anyone can think of. For the serious naturalist, there-
fore, evolution is an absolutely essential plank in his platform; and 
hence the antecedent probability of evolution, given philosophical natu-
ralism, is high. It is this, I take it, that is in part responsible for those tri-
umphal cries of certainty (above, pp. 0000). 
Then I went on to argue that (because of the improbability of the 
Naturalistic Origins Thesis) the probability of CES with respect to 
Christian theism and the empirical evidence is very low, and the proba-
bility of TCA with respect to that same body is perhaps somewhat less 
than that of its denial, i.e., less than 1/2. I argued this by claiming first 
that the antecedent probability (its probability independent of the 
empirical evidence) of TCA is perhaps (judgments of this kind are of 
course necessarily infirm) less than 1/2; I then went on to say that when 
we add the empirical evidence, things don't change; on theism and the 
empirical evidence, TCA is still somewhat less probable than its denial. 
Now why should we think the antecedent probability of TCA on 
Christian theism is less than 1/2? First, according to Christian theism, 
Cod is constantly at work in his universe. He is in constant, close, inti-
mate causal contact with his creation, supporting and upholding it in 
being: were it not for this constant upholding activity, the cosmos would 
disappear like a candle flame in a high wind. Second, most Christians 
hold that Cod has frequently treated the things he has made in unusual 
and special ways: water turns into wine, human beings emerge unhurt 
from a fiery furnace and are miraculously cured of disease; and above all, 
there is the wondrous splendor of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. Apparently, therefore, Cod is not averse to working in his creation 
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in special ways. But then, so I said, there is no particular antecedent prob-
ability in favor of the idea that he wouldn't do anything different or spe-
cial in the creation of life, say, or in the creation of special kinds of life. So 
it is hard to see how there is any antecedent probability in favor of GES, 
and hard to see that there is any antecedent probability in favor of TCA. 
Indeed, if God acts specially over one large and important range of his 
interaction with his creatures, isn't it a bit more probable than not that he 
would act specially over other large and important ranges? 
So I'm inclined to think the antecedent probability of TCA with 
respect to Christian theism is a bit less than 1/2. But we still have to fac-
tor in what we know about the origin of life; and with respect to 
Christian theism and the present evidence, the Naturalistic Origins 
Thesis seems extremely improbable. As modern biochemistry reveals, 
the simplest forms of life display an astonishing, stunning complexity, a 
complicated interrelatedness and functional integrity that boggles the 
mind. According to Francis Crick, life must be regarded as the next 
thing to a miracle; according to Harold P. Kein of Santa Clara 
University, chairman of a National Academy of Sciences committee that 
recently reviewed origin-of-life research, "The simplest bacterium is so 
damn complicated from the point of view of a chemist that it is almost 
impossible to imagine how it happened."33 It therefore looks as if God 
did something different and special in the creation of life.34 (Of course 
things may change; that is how things look now.) These things taken 
together suggest that the Lord might very well have done something dif-
ferent and special, not only in creating life in the first instance, but also 
in creating certain subsequent forms of life. If he did something special 
in creating life, what would prevent him from doing something special 
at other points in his great creation drama, perhaps creating specially 
the original representatives of some of the phyla, or human beings, or 
still other forms of life? It would seem entirely in character. I am there-
fore inclined to maintain my suggestion that the antecedent probability 
of TCA, from a theistic point of view, is perhaps a bit less than 1/2. 
Now McMullin is especially inclined to dispute my claims about the 
antecedent probability of TCA. He makes initial heavy weather over the 
very asking of the question what God is likely to do; if I understand him, 
however, he goes on to claim that in fact it is unlikely, indeed very 
unlikely, that God would do something special and different, or create 
something specially in bringing it about that there are human beings, or 
certain kinds of plants and animals, or even, presumably, life itself: 
To carry the argument a stage further: what would the eloquent texts of 
Genesis, Job, Isaiah and the Psalms, lead one to expect? What have theolo-
gians made of these texts? This is obviously a theme that far transcends 
the compass of an essay such as this one. I can make a couple of simple 
points. The Creator whose powers are gradually revealed in these texts 
is omnipotent and all-wise, far beyond the reach of human reckoning. 
His Providence extends to all His creatures; they are all part of His single 
plan, only a fragment of which we know, and that darkly. Would such a 
Being be likely to "intervene" in the cosmic process, that is, deal in two 
different manners with it? (Let me emphasize that I am uncomfortable 
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with this language of "likelihood" in regard to God's actions, as though 
we were somehow capable of catching the Creator of the galactic uni-
verse in the nets of our calculations.) Why should an omnipotent God 
not create a universe in which God's ends with regard to all creatures 
except humans would be achieved in a natural way? If one may use the 
language of antecedent probability at all here-and I am not at all certain 
that one may-it surely must point away from special creation." 
A couple of comments on this passage: first, the issue is not, of course, 
whether there is some way to calculate the probability that God would 
do this or that; at best, on a topic like that, we have little more than 
crude guesses. And I applaud McMullin's implicit suggestion that any 
ideas we might have about the antecedent likelihood of God's doing this 
or that should be at best tentative. I think it a bit more probable that 
God would do something different and special in the creation of life, 
and human beings, and perhaps some other forms of life; but any such 
views, surely, should be tentative and held with appropriate diffidence. 
It certainly befits no one to be at all cocksure here. 
This said, however, I fail to see any force in the considerations 
McMullin puts forward. God is indeed omnipotent and all-wise; his 
providence does indeed extend to all creatures; and indeed we know but 
a fragment of his total plan. These things are true; but how do they bear 
on the question whether God would or would not, for example, create in 
stages: first creating inanimate material, say, then later doing something 
special in creating life, perhaps, and then still later in creating human 
life? (It is part of the major theistic religions to think that God has creat-
ed humankind in his own image; might he not have thought it appropri-
ate to create human life in a special way, by way of an act of special cre-
ation?) We know, after all, that God is not averse to acting in special 
ways, as the many miracles recorded in the Bible attest. 
McMullin seems to think of God as like a classical artist, devoted to 
ideals of simplicity, and elegance, economy and restraint. But why think 
of Him like that? Perhaps God is more like a romantic artist with limit-
less resources, extravagant, prolific, fecund, overflowing with uproari-
ous creative activity, disdaining restraint and economy of action. (The 
millions of species that have become extinct would be examples of this 
exuberant fertility.) After all, what are the attractions of economy for 
Him? Creatures limited in energy, power and time have need for econo-
my; God suffers from no such limitations. Is it instead the idea that 
God's interest in economy of effort is a matter of aesthetic preference? 
But is there even the slightest reason to think so? The Lord constantly 
acts in his creation; apart from his upholding activity, it would disap-
pear like a puff of smoke; why would he think it beneath his dignity, or 
aesthetically unpleasant, or otherwise disagreeable to take a hand in his 
creation in other ways? Perhaps he is very much a hands-on God. 
Perhaps he marks various important transitions and junctures in the his-
tory of his creation by special celebratory or ceremonial activity of some 
sort. Perhaps an example of this sort of activity is his creating certain 
kinds of life specially, thus symbolically marking the importance of the 
transition. "Are not sparrows two for a penny? Yet without your 
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Father's leave," says Jesus, "not one of them can fall to the ground." If 
the Lord's creation scheme is such that his leave is needed for a sparrow 
to fall, might he not have created various forms of life-perhaps even 
sparrows-specially? Why not? 
So my claim is that the antecedent probability of episodes of special 
creation with respect to Christian theism but prior to the empirical evi-
dence-i.e., the evidence bearing on TCA-is a bit greater than 1/2. 
McMullin, by contrast, insists that salvation history tells us nothing 
about natural history. What God does with respect to salvation gives us 
no probabilities with respect to special creation: 
The story of salvation is a story about men and women, about 
the burden of being human. . .. The biblical account of God's 
dealing with humankind provides no warrant whatever for sup-
posing that God would have brought the ancestors of the vari-
ous kinds of plants and animals to be outside the ordinary order 
of nature ( p. 324). 
The reason seems to be that the story of salvation is "about free beings 
who sinned and who therefore needed God's intervention. Dealing with 
the human predicament 'naturally' so to speak would not have been suf-
ficient"(p.324). Here McMullin suggests that God would perhaps have 
preferred to deal with the human predicament without doing something 
unusual, but that wasn't possible; he therefore had to act specially. 
Since he wasn't thus constrained when it came to creation, however, his 
acting specially in salvation history doesn't make it any more probable 
that he would do so in creation. 
But how do we know that God was somehow obliged to act specially in 
salvation history? This seems to be a new theological idea; like most origi-
nal theological ideas, it warrants suspicion. What is our source of infor-
mation as to God's constraints here? In any event, he certainly wasn't 
obliged to act specially so of tell in salvation history. According to Catholic 
doctrine, a miracle occurs whenever the mass is properly celebrated; on 
nearly all Christian views, God regularly guides and directs his people 
individually and his church collectively by virtue of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the believer's heart;36 each of these acts is special in the relevant 
sense. And so far as the "ordinary order of nature" is concerned, on the 
views both of John Calvin and Pope Pius XII (and in the face of fire power 
like that, who am I to demur?), God creates specially a new human soul or 
person whenever a human being comes into existence. If so, the order of 
nature regularly and ordinarily involves very many acts of special divine 
creation; at present the rate would be about 3 such acts per second. Some 
Christians might reject Pius' and Calvin's claim, but presumably not on 
the grounds that God has an aversion to acts of special creation. 
Of course these are deep and difficult waters. I am inclined to think 
the antecedent probabilities slightly favor episodes of special creation; 
but I can certainly see the attractions of agnosticism here. Perhaps the 
most reasonable attitude is one of agnosticism: one just doesn't know 
what these antecedent probabilities are. What seems to me unreason-
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able, however, is to be confident that antecedent probability favors TeA 
or CES. And if 1 am right, then we must rely most heavily, here, on the 
empirical evidence.37 
B. The Empirical Evidence 
Turning briefly and finally to that empirical evidence, there are a cou-
ple of points that need to be made. (I must caution you that neither 
McMullin nor I can claim any expertise with respect to the empirical evi-
dence; all we know is what we read in the papers. Think of each of the 
following sentences as prefaced by "I'm no expert, but ... ") McMullin 
writes as if the theistic skeptic with respect to evolution is fighting a sort 
of desperate rearguard action, with a succession of new and powerful 
pieces of evidence ever compelling further retreat, as one major gap after 
another is closed, one major transition after another definitively nailed 
down. And it isn't only McMullin who thinks this; there is a sort of 
widespread impression, a kind of widely shared but uncritical assump-
tion, among academics who view the subject from a certain distance, 
that these major gaps and transitions are in fact steadily closing, or at 
least narrowing. 
But where are all these gaps being closed by further discoveries? 
They are not easy to find. As McMullin points out, the fossil record con-
tains many sequences of extinct forms (e.g., trilobites) "where the devel-
opment of specific anatomical features can be traced in detail through 
the rock layers" (315). This is indeed so, but does not bear on the main 
problems for TeA with the fossil record, which have to do with the lack, 
in that record, of sequences of intermediary forms between the really 
major taxa-phyla and classes, for example.38 "As new fossil evidence is 
uncovered," he says, (315) "paleontologists continue to uncover stage 
after stage in crucial linking: forms such as the therapsids, for example, 
the forms that related reptiles with the earliest mammals." This is mis-
leading exaggeration. It suggests that paleontologists have discovered 
and continue to discover many forms that link, say, fish with amphibia, 
amphibia with reptiles, reptiles with birds, or reptiles with mammals. 
But so far as 1 know, this is not so. So far as 1 know, therapsids are the 
only candidates for a link between reptiles and mammals (and they have 
been known for a long time). Although there is some controversy about 
the therapsids, perhaps they really could be thought of as something like 
a linking forms between reptiles and mammals;39 but if TeA were true, 
one would expect vastly many more such forms. Furthermore, 
Archaeopteryx, known since shortly after Darwin's death and formerly 
the only serious candidate for a similar post linking reptiles and birds, 
has according to some been demoted by the discovery of modern birds 
antedating it. And things stand no better with respect to those other 
major gaps. 
In fact it looks as if the shoe is on the other foot. "When I think of the 
eye," Darwin said, "I shudder". He was thinking of the enormous com-
plexity of the eye, and the strain involved in believing that an instru-
ment of that delicate interrelatedness and functional integrity could 
have evolved by anything like the mechanisms he suggested. Perhaps 
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he was also thinking of Mivart's specific objections (above, pp. 375). But 
Darwin had no idea at all of the true complexity of the visual system;'O if 
he shuddered at what he knew then, he would have quaked uncontrol-
lably had he known what we know now. 
Secondly, Mivart's worry returns in spades when we think of "irre-
ducible complexity". According to Michael Behe)1 the cilium (used by 
many kinds of cells for swimming) is composed of some six molecules. 
All six are required for the cilium's function; if any is absent, no ciliary 
function is possible. Cilia, says Behe, are "irreducibly complex"; in that 
we can't envision any simpler forms that will carry out the cilium's func-
tion. In the case of Mivart's eye, we can certainly envision some interme-
diate forms; the problem is that it is hard to see how there could be the 
required complete series. (There is also the fact that it isn't really known 
that such a series is even biologically possible.) With the cilium, howev-
er, we can't envisage any members of a series of functional precursors at 
all. Still further, says Behe, this example of irreducible complexity is 
only one of several; there is also, for example, the system that targets 
proteins for delivery to subcellular compartments, as well as aspects of 
blood clotting, closed circular DNA, electron transport, the bacterial fla-
gellum, telomeres, photosynthesis, and still other structures. 
Thirdly, in Darwin's day it was possible to attribute the failure to find 
intermediate forms between the major taxa to the fact that the fossil record 
was largely unexplored. Since Darwin's day, however, the number of fos-
sils discovered and catalogued has increased a hundredfold; it is no longer 
possible (or at any rate plausible) to make that excuse, and the gaps are at 
least as great as ever. Lots of series with some modification have been 
found, as with trilobites; the great gaps, however, remain. 
Fourth, there is the gap between life and nonlife; as we have seen, this 
gap has greatly widened since Darwin's day. 
Fifth, there is the Cambrian explosion. The fossil record displays uni-
cellular life going all the way back, so they tell us, to 3 or 3.5 billion 
years ago-only a billion years or so after the formation of the earth 
itself and much less than a billion years after the earth cooled sufficient-
ly to permit life. There is no fossil record of skeletal animals until about 
530 million years ago, 2.5 or 3 billion years after the appearance of uni-
cellular life. Then there is a veritable explosion of invertebrate life, a riot 
of shapes and anatomical designs, with ancestors of the major contem-
porary forms and all the marine invertebrate phyla represented, together 
with a lot of forms wholly alien in the contemporary context.42 None of 
this was known in Darwin's day, and would surely have given him 
pause. And now in a recent issue of Science we learn that the time dur-
ing which this explosion took place was much shorter than previously 
thought; it all happened during a period of no more than 5 or 10 million 
years,"3 a period that seems much too short to accommodate such furious 
evolutionary creativity, at least with respect to any known mecha-
nisms.44 On balance, it is likely that if Darwin knew what we now know 
about the complexity of such organs as the mamallian eye and the 
human brain, the enormous intricacy revealed by biochemistry and mol-
ecular biology (including the astonishing complexity of the simplest 
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forms of life), the Cambrian explosion, the lack of closure in the fossil 
record, and so on, he would have been neither a Darwinian nor a devo-
tee of TCA. 
For a Christian, therefore, one who is not shackled by the demands of 
naturalism, the right attitude towards TCA is one of a certain cordial 
skepticism. TCA is a very pretty theory with many of the so-called theo-
retical virtues; it has been a fine source of research projects; incorporated 
into God's great drama of creation and Incarnation as in McMullin's 
concluding peroration, it is attractive. It doesn't follow, however, that it 
is true, nor even that it is more likely than not.4S 
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